Bacle D. Taylor v. E. M. Boyle Corporation : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Bacle D. Taylor v. E. M. Boyle Corporation : Brief of
Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Maurice Harding; Attorney for Respondent;
Herbert F. Smart; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Taylor v. E. M. Boyle Corp., No. 8028 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2031
BACLE D. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
E. M. ROYLE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 8028 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Cour;: of the 
State of Utah, Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, Judge. 
MAURICE HARDING, 
Attorney for Respondent 
HERBERT F. SMART, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
l'fEW C~NTUBY PRJNTINO 00., PROVO. l!T.-\Iil 
R~GEfVED 
SEP 2 8 E:53 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF .... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . 1 
STATElVIENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON TO SUS-
TAIN JUDGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
ARGUMENT.................................... 6 
POINT 1. RESBONDENT USED THE SHORT 
FORM OF COMPLAINT WIDCH WOULD 
SUPPORT A JUDGMENT ON EITHER EX-
PRESS OR IMPLIED CONTRACT. THE 
QUESTIONS OF EXPRESS AND IMPLIED 
CONTRACTS WERE BOTH BEFORE THE 
COURT................................. 6 
POINT 2. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER ON THE BASIS OF QUANTUM 
MERUIT ................................ 10 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
CASES CITED 
Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., C. C. A. N. Y. 
1945, 148 F. 2d, 974.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Gledhill v. Malouf, 58 Utah 105, 197 Pac. 725. . . . . . . . 8 
Hawkins v. Frick-Reid Supply Corp., C. C. A. Tex. 1946, 
154 F. 2d, 88................................ 8 
Jones v. Brisbin, (Wash.) 247 P. 2d, 891............ 7 
Morris v. Russell, (Utah) 236 P. 2d, 451............. 9 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Restatement of Contracts, Vol. ~72 (1) (a),........ . 7 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 (c) (1). . . . . . 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Sttpreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
BACLE D. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
E. M. ROYLE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE 
NO. 8028 
While in the main the Statement of Facts contained in 
appellant's brief are correct, there are a few of such state-
ments which are not, as we read the evidence, supported 
by any competent testimony, but are contrary to the evi-
dence. There are also some facts established by the evi-
dence which we_ deem material to the issues here involved 
which are not mentioned in appellant'~ Statement of Facts. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS ·::·. 
It is said on Page 2 of appellant's brief that "appellant 
denied there was a new contract between the parties and 
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stated the old contract continued, while negotiations were 
proceeding toward the formation of a new contract." 
In connection with the above quoted statement, we 
should like to quote the appellant's testimony, which will 
be found in the Transcript, Pages 6, and 15 to 18: 
Q. "Do you recall testifying in the city court, 
in which you stated that you told Mr. Taylor in Feb-
ruary, of 1951, that you would have to change the con-
tract commencing March 1, 1951:" 
A. "Yes sir." 
Q. "And did you have a conversation with him in 
February, of 1951, wherein you told him that the con-
tract that was then in existence, which would termi-
nate February 28th, would have to be changed com-
mencing March 1st of that year?" 
A. "Yes. In substance and effect I conveyed 
that thought to him. Not exactly in the language you 
outlined, but that's the direction in which my mind was 
travelling." (Tr. P. 6) 
Q. ,.Now the situation then on March 1, 1951, 
was that Mr. Taylor was in your employ, that you 
owed him $2,358.00 thereabouts for bonus, and you 
had told him in February that the contract for the new 
year starting March 1, 1951, would have to·be the sub-
ject of an agreement? That's right, is it not?" 
A. "Yes. That we'd have to go over the situa-
tion." 
Q. "So on March 1, 1951, at the commencement 
of a new contract year, he had no definite contract 
with you?" (Tr. P. 15) 
A. "EXcept that we had been following in days 
past." 
Q. "Well, you had told him, had you not, that 
had to be revised?" 
A. "That would be correct, yes." 
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Q. "And I think you told us at the preceding hear-
ing that it was your intention to revise it downward?" 
A. "I had served notice in substance and effect 
that a realignment of the contract was in my tl:link-
ing necessary, yes. It would have to be changed, that's 
correct.'' 
Q. "Did you discuss with him any of the changes 
that you would make? Before March 1, 1951? 
A. "Well, yes, we did. It seems in my memory, 
if I recall correctly. At that time we may not have 
gone into it too far, we may have canvassed it slightly, 
we had worked together so long and understood so 
well, that it wasn't necessary for a great deal to be 
said, but in April or May we got down to the business 
of getting serious on the thing, and talking about the 
issues, and on May 13th, or the 11th, about there, I 
wrote Mr. Taylor a letter relevant to a conversation 
we had had a few days before, discussing the pertinent 
facts, or the new contract." 
Q. "You say, relative to a letter, you had a dis-
cussion a few days before May 11th?" 
A. "That's right." 
Q. "Mr. Royle, I show you what has been marked 
for identification as plaintiff's Exhibit "F", and I'll ask 
you whether or not that is a letter that you, as man-
ager of the Royle Corporation, and defendant herein, 
wrote to Mr. Taylor, the plaintiff?" 
A. "Yes, that's the one that was written. It's 
my signature on it." 
Q. "Now in this letter you say: 'On the ques-
tion of the coming year for salary etc., I expect a lar-
ger run than this year, somewhere between $75,000.00 
and $100,000.00', do you not?'" 
A. "If it's expressed there then I wrote it." 
Q. "And you say: 'I cannot see the $5;00 per set 
and a 10% on the first $30,000.00 under prevailing con-
ditions.' You say that in the letter?" 
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A. "Yes. We were in a depressed market at 
that time." 
Q. You also say: 'I will be down in a few days and 
see you. These are some ideas we might talk over. "? 
A. "That's right." (Tr. P. 17) 
Q. "Did you come down a few days later and talk 
with him about it?" 
A. "I was down almost every week, and if the 
subject were neglected that time we caught it the next 
time. The contract between Mr. Taylor and myself 
was sometimes several months in the course of bring-
ing together. No great hurry about it seemingly on 
either side." 
Q. "Then when you would get together from time 
to time it would relate back to the beginning of your 
contract year, would it not?" 
A. "Yes." (Tr. P. 17) 
Q. "That is March 1st?" 
A. "That's right." (Tr. P. 18) 
As to the statement near the bottom of Page 2 of ap-
pellant's brief that "appellant paid and respondent accepted 
without protest, question or objections, compensation on 
the same terms and amounts as during the previous year," 
we should like to quote the appellant's testimony as follows: 
A. . . . . (Line 9) "but we followed the ba-
sis of a $30,000.00 volume, against which Mr. Taylor 
drew $250.00 per month salary, or a rate of 10% on 
the first $30,000.00. In addition to this 10% on the 
first $30,000.00 he had this $5.00 per set bonus, and 
then anything over $30,000.00 in the year an additional 
7% was to be paid. That's my recollection." (Tr. P. 5) 
Q. "Mr. Royle, during the period from March 1, 
1951, until Mr. Taylor left your employment, you were 
paying him on the basis of the $250.00 a month, at the 
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old schedule? I think that's what you indicated; is 
that correct?" 
A. "That would be correct." 
Q. "And that was the basis on which you pre-
ceeded during the spring of 1951 ?'' 
A. "That's correct." (Tr. P. 30) 
Q. (Tr. Page 36, Line 26) "Mrs Royle, can you 
turn to the sales record and tell us how many unit sales 
there were during the months of March, April, May, 
June and July? By months?" 
A. "That's of 1951 ?" 
Q. "Yes." 
A. "I have 29 units. More than that were re-
ported, but there were some repossessions. We pulled 
those out." 
Q. "Can you tell me how many by months?" 
A. "In March I have 14. 7 in April. 5 in May. 
2 in June. 1 in July." (Tr. P. 37) 
From the testimony of respondent, Transcript Page 44: 
Q. "What did he say about paying you?" 
A. "Said it should be paid at the old rate until 
this was settled, but you can see he didn't follow 
through on the old rate." 
The above testimony is quoted for the purpose of show-
ing what the agreement from March 1, 1950 to February 
28, 1951 was; that respondent was paid at the rate of $250.00 
each month from March 1, 1951 to July 13, 1951, pending 
the consummation of a new agreement; that he made 29 
unit sales during the period from March 1, 1951 to July 13, 
1951, entitling him to 'bonus payments of $5.00. each, if the 
prior year's contract were extended; and the record does 
not show he was paid the $5.00 per unit bonus. 
While the transcript is silent on the matter, with the 
exception of the. respondent's statement that "he didn't 
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follow through on the old rate;• in fairness it must be stated w~ 
that the respondent was paid on all unit sales for the months Co'J 
of March, April, and May, 1951, but was not paid on such t6 
sales for June and July, 1951. :,): 
STATEMENT 0~., POINTS RELIED UPON TO 
SUSTAIN JUDGMENT 
1. RESPONDENT USED THE SHORT FORM OF 
CO:MPL.AINT \VHICH WOULD SUPPORT A JUDGMENT 
ON EITHER EXPRESS OH. IMPLIED CONTRACT. THE 
QUESTIONS OF EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONTRACI'S 
WERE BOTH BEFORE THE COURT. 
2. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE F1NDINGS OF FACf THAT RESPONDENT IS EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER ON THE BASIS OF QUANTUM 
:MERUIT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
RESPONDENT USED THE SHORT FORM OF COM-
PLAINT WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A JUDGMENT ON 
EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONTRACT. THE 
QUESTIONS OF EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONTRACTS 
WERE BOTH BEFORE THIE COURT. 
Respondent commenced this action in the City Court 
of Provo City, using the short form of complaint. The items 
in the account attached to the complaint were based on both 
express and implied contracts, three of such items being 
admitted. It was respondent's contention that he had made 
an express oral contract with the appellant for services for 
the year March 1, 1951 to February 29th, 1952, and that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
was the theory upon which the case was tried in the City 
Court, resulting in the court finding there had been an ex-
press contract, as respondent claimed, and awarding judg-
ment accordingly. 
Upon the hearing of the case on appeal to the nistrict 
Court, the respondent's main theory was that he had an 
express contract with appellant for his services, but he also 
offered evidence, which was received, showing the reason-
able value of his services. The court found there was no 
express contract, nor a continuation of the prior year's con-
tract, but that respondent was entitled to recover on quan-
tum meriut, and gave judgment on that basis. 
In this case there is no question whatever that respond-
ent performed the services for appellant from March 1, 1951 
to July 13th, 1951; that appellant accepted the services; 
that the services were offered with the expectation of com-
pensation; and that compensation to respondent for such 
services at the rate of $5,000.00 per year was not unreason-
able. 
"Where a person, with reasonable opportunity to 
reject offered services, takes the benefit of them under 
circumstances which would indicate, to a reasonable 
man, that they were offered with the expectation of 
compensation, a contract, complete with mutual as-
sent, results. 1 Restatement, Contracts #72 (1) (,a)." 
Jones v. Brisbin, (Wash) 247 P. 2d 891. 
As to whether or not the complaint is sufficient to sup-
port the Judgment, we should like to cite Rule 54 (c) (1) 
U.C.P. R.: 
"Generally. Except as to a party against whom 
a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor 
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it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not de-
manded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given 
for or against one or more of several claimants· and 
. , 
1t may, when the justice of the case requires it, deter-
mine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves." 
In the case of Hawkins v. Frick-Reid Supply Corp., c. 
C. A. Tex. 1946,154 F. 2d 88, the court said: 
uA complaint is sufficient if it sets forth facts 
which show that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief 
which the court can grant, since every final judgment 
must grant the relief to which the party in whose fa-
vor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
And in the case of Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply 
Co., C. C. A. N. Y. 1945, 148 F. 2d, 974, the court said: 
uThe demand for judgment loses its restrictive na-
ture when the parties are at issue, for particular legal 
theories of counsel yield to the court's duty to grant 
the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled, 
whether demanded or not." 
In the case of Gledhill v. Malouf, 58 Utah 105, 197 Pac. 
725, our court said (quoting from Pages 111 and 112): 
uNo fault is to be found with the doctrine an-
nounced by the cases and authorities relied on by plain-
tiffs.- They state the general rule to be adhered to in 
both law and equity cases that the findings must .be 
responsive to and within the issues created by the plead-
ings. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the 
·rule should be applied in every case where both parties 
to a particular transaction fail to properly interpret 
and allege or set forth their legal relationship. and_ their 
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rights under it. In many cases the courts are called 
upon to, and frequently do, adjudicate and determine 
the rights of the respective parties before them con-
trary to the theories of both litigants. In the case at 
bar, as has been seen, both plaintiffs and the defend-
ant pleaded that an oral agreement had been entered 
into with respect to the purchase and sale of lands. 
True, as it frequently happens, they materially differed 
as to the exact terms and conditions of the contract 
as well as their rights under it. However, they both 
pleaded that they entered into it and acted upon it. 
Having done so, some legal relationship between them 
had been formed, and the court was, under the issues 
joined, called upon and had the right to determine their 
legal status and rights under the contract." 
We feel, however, that we need to cite no other au-
thority for our position than Morris v. Russell, (Utah) 236 
P. 2d 451. Quoting from Pages 454 and 455: 
"Plaintiff, however, refers us to Rule 54(c) (1}, 
U. R. C. P., from which we have heretofore quoted the 
applicable part, and which provides that every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which a party is 
entitled even if such relief has not been asked for in 
the pleadings. 
"Thus, apparently, if the plaintiff proved he was 
entitled to relief in quantum meruit, it would have been 
error for the trial court to refuse him that relief even 
though at an earlier time in the proceedings the court 
had dismissed the quantum meruit count. Cases de-
cided under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 
U. S. C. A., from which the rule was taken, illustrate 
that this is true. (Citing cases) 
"The adding of the quantum meruit count, was 
the equivalent of permitting an amendment to conform 
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to the proof. The defendants were in no worse position 
than if the quantum meruit count had not been there 
in the first place." 
POINT 2 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT RESPONDENT IS EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER ON THE BASIS OF QUANTU·M 
MERUIT. 
The testimony of appellant shows that respondent's 
earnings in his capacity as salesman and manager for ap-
pellant during the period of March 1, 1950 to February 28, 
1951, were $6,278.91, and that appellant didn't consider 
such amount unreasonable. He also stated that he didn't 
consider $5,000.00 per year guaranteed salary unreason-
able (Tr. P. 26) for respondent's services. 
In view of the appellant's statements, it seems the 
court had ample evidence as to reasonable value of the ser-
vices rendered. The fact that respondent did not give any 
testimony regarding the reasonable value of his services is 
immaterial. Surely, a party is entitled to make his case 
on any evidence available, including his adversary's testi-
mony, if he is able to do so. 
Appellant contends that the prior year's contract was 
continued during the period in question, and in this regard, 
we are mindful of the rule stated in 35 Am. Jur. Pages 497-
498, Section 65, Master and Servant: 
"Most authorities hold, in accord with the general 
rule that a servant continuing in the master's service 
after the expiration of a definite term is prima facie 
presumed to continue under the terms of the old con-
tract, that there is an implied agreement that the em-
, ill 
' ~ 
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ployer will continue to pay the employee the remunera-
tion specified in the original contract. In support of 
this rule it is said that if the employee remains in the 
same employment after his term of service has expired 
without making demand for increased pay, the em-
ployer may well presume that no increased compensa-
tion is expected or will be required. This presumption 
is rebuttable by proof that a new contract for the con-
tinued period has been entered into, or of facts and 
circumstances showing that the parties did not intend 
to continue upon the terms and conditions of the orig-
inal one, . . . ." 
We acknowledge that if the respondent had continued 
in appellant's service after the expiration of the prior year's 
contract, with nothing being said or done about changing 
the terms of such contract, that the old contract would be 
presumed to continue. However, in the presence of the 
positive statements of appellant that he had told respond-
ent in February, 1951, that the old contract would have to 
be changed commencing March 1, of that year, even with 
no definite notice of what the changes would be or the ex-
tent thereof, we cannot understand how the presumption 
of continuance would apply. Therefore, the court had 
ample evidence for its finding that the old contract had been 
terminated, and respondent was working on an implied con-
tract only. 
It should be borne in mind that the $250.00 per month 
paid to respondent under the contract of March 1, 1950 to 
February 28, 1951, was not salary in the sense that it was 
full compensation for services rendered from month to 
month during such period. Appellant testified that the 
$250.00 was a drawing account (Tr. 7). Neither was the 
proposed $5,000.00 per year to be considered as salary in 
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the sense that it was to be full compensation for services 
rendered; it also was a drawing account (Tr. 24-30). The 
word "salary" was used very loosely by the parties to refer 
to a "drawing account" and also as "wages." (Tr. 25-26) 
(Exhibit A). 
CONCLUSION 
It seems to us that the respondent is entitled to recover 
for his services from March 1, 1951 to July 13, 1951 on one 
of three theories: 
(a) An express new contract for the year com-
mencing March 1, 1951; (which the court held had not 
been consummated) 
(b) A continuation of the prior year's contract; 
(which the court held had been terminated) 
(c) Quantum meruit. (Upon which theory the 
court gave judgment) 
We submit, therefore, that the judgment appealed from 
sbo.uld be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAURICE HARDING, 
Attorney for Respondent, 
232 West Center Street, 
Provo, Utah 
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